This short article, based on a presentation at the London School of Economics, criticizes the common opinion that "green growth" offers a relatively painless -some even say pain-free -transition path for capitalist economies. After a brief summary of the daunting arithmetic entailed in combining fast decarbonization with continuing growth, the article advances 3 propositions. First, market-based carbon mitigation programs, such as carbon trading, cannot be sufficient and must be coupled with other policy pillars that foster transformative investment and widespread regulation. Second, a political economy of climate policy needs to draw on the lessons of comparative social policy research, which emphasizes the role of international pressures, interests, institutions, and ideas. Taking these into account gives a more realistic perspective on climate policy making in today's neoliberal world. Third, more radical policies on both consumption and production are called for, to ensure that carbon mitigation is not pursued at the expense of equity and social welfare. These include policies to restrain high-carbon luxury consumption and a transition toward shorter paid working time. The conclusion is that a realistic program of green growth will be immensely difficult and entail radical political change.
be free." 1 Perhaps he is talking about another planet; certainly not this one, at this time.
My background has been in social policy, studied and researched from different angles: economics, political economy, political and normative theory, and public policy. Six years ago, I decided to devote myself to studying the interaction between climate change and social policy, broadly construed. This has led me into numerous byways, and I am now writing a book to try to pull this together. I want to develop a perspective on the intersection between climate change and its mitigation and the pursuit of sustainable and equitable welfare. This would necessarily be interdisciplinary. But it certainly involves taking a position on "green growth." I am no expert on this topic, but I have read around it and would like to start with some comments on it, drawing on an earlier report written for the British Academy. 2 In one sense, green growth is the only game in town. The only logical alternatives are, on the one hand, that more growth per se is the solution to dealing with climate change and severe environmental threats -the Bjorn Lomborg and Matt Ridley perspective; and on the other hand, that growth is the problem and we must move toward degrowth or postgrowth. The first seems to me incoherent, and the second politically impossible. But the middle ground of green growth covers a vast terrain, which needs unpacking.
In this article, I shall concentrate on just one aspect of "green-ness," the mitigation of climate change, but this is the most stringent current test of green growth. I focus on the rich world, though recognizing that this cannot be divorced from global climate policies and the global issues of justice, need satisfaction, equity, and governance. My research concerns the advanced economies within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where current emissions per head are several times that necessary to stabilize global climate.
Climate Change Scenarios
One hundred sixty-seven countries have endorsed the Copenhagen Accord, agreeing that the safest maximum amount that global temperatures should be allowed to rise above the pre-Industrial Revolution level is 2 C. Some scientists claim that this is too lenient a target, but let us accept it for the time being. Carbon Tracker, in collaboration with the Grantham Research Institute, has conducted new analyses of the total amount of carbon that can be burnt to achieve an 80% probability of staying below the 2 C carbon budgets. This came to 900 gigatons (billions of tons) of CO 2 for the period from 2000 to 2050, 14 years of which have now elapsed. 3 This far exceeds present-day usable reserves and cumulated burning at current trends. And as Bill McKibben points out, "'Reasonable' in this case means four chances in five, or somewhat worse odds than playing Russian roulette with a six-shooter." 4 Yet global emissions are now accelerating, not declining: they have risen about 3% a year since 2000. The IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report stated: "Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems." 5 The World Bank warns that the globe is on a path to heat up by 4 C by the end of the century -if the global community fails to act on climate change. This would trigger "a cascade of cataclysmic changes that include extreme heatwaves, declining global food stocks, and a sea-level rise affecting hundreds of millions of people." 6 And so on.
The policy implications are clearly stated by Nick Stern: "We essentially have to go from around 50 billion tonnes CO2e per annum as a world now (2013) to well below 20 in 2050. Or in per capita terms, assuming population grows from 7 billion now to 9 billion by 2050, from 7 tonnes per capita per annum now to around 2 in 2050. But that is not all: assuming a global growth rate of some 2.5% pa over the next 4 decades, emissions per unit of output would need to fall by a factor of, not 3.5, but 7-8." 7 All in 35 years. And these estimates use a probability of 50% of avoiding 2 C: three bullets in each revolver! Nick Stern recognizes this as a call for a radical transformation, an energyindustrial revolution. This is a long way from saving the planet for free. Green growth is a huge challenge.
From Prices to Path Transformation
Michael Grubb's new book, Planetary Economics, also indicates the scale of the conceptual challenge. 8 He identifies 3 policy "domains" embracing different conceptions of risk, different fields of theory, different economic processes, and different implications for public policy.
First, the dominant domain, based on neoclassical economics and optimization theory, stresses the goal of pricing carbon. The policy solution to address climate change is to price carbon so as to impose costs on polluters and thus internalize the externalities they generate, thereby providing price incentives for sustainable energy. The second domain embraces low recognition of risk, satisficing, and the goal of improving energy efficiency; the dominant policy solutions are enforcement of public standards and citizen engagement. The third domain draws on evolutionary economics and complexity theory to prioritize the goal of economic transformation; the policy solution is radical innovation by large, private-sector organizations alongside strategic public planning and infrastructure investment.
Grubb is adamant that all 3 domains must be involved if the goal is to transform the global energy system (his focus here). There is no magic bullet. All 3 are equally important, operating at different scales in time and space. In particular, he says, we must avoid the "ideological search" for market solutions. Like others, he is critical of neoclassical economics assumptions concerning rationality, equilibrium, and its neglect of strong uncertainty. Stern's call for an "energy-industrial revolution" clearly fits in with this approach. 9 Yet Grubb's book remains firmly within an economics framework and does not embrace much political economy. There is evidence that carbon trading and offset schemes attract rent-seeking and gaming by corporations, financial institutions, and other market actors. 10 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, ostensibly a mechanism to help regulated installations cover their CO 2 emissions by trading in allowances, is in practice a financial market used for hedging and speculation. 11 And political lobbying will further distort the end results. The assumption that real-world policies will be optimal is unacceptable. Other critical economists, such as Terry Barker and Frank Ackerman, call for more interdisciplinary study of practices and cultures, such as those studied by sociologists of climate change, and ways of shifting these to leverage change toward lowercarbon lifestyles. [12] [13] [14] Only a multidisciplinary approach will provide adequate policy tools for successful green growth.
The Politics of Environmental States
One of the strengths of social policy and political science analysis over the past quarter century has been the study of cross-national variations in welfare states, mainly across the OECD world. 15 I am applying some of the frameworks and techniques developed here to the study of cross-national variations in "environmental states": states today that possess a significant set of institutions and practices dedicated to the management of the environment and societalenvironmental interactions -a growing area of research. 16 Here I use "5 Is" framework, developed previously, to bring together all the factors influencing the rise of welfare systems: industrialization, interests, institutions, ideas, and international influences. 17 As with variations across welfare regimes, there are many conceptual problems, e.g., distinguishing policy outputs from final environmental or welfare performance. In a crude count of "leader" and "laggard" countries in several recent comparative researches, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries are regular "leader countries," and the United States, Canada, and Australia are the regular "laggards."
Using my framework, I advance some tentative conclusions (I. Gough, unpublished data, 2014):
. International and global influences: these are important in driving the adoption of climate change policies. International linkages, both political and economic, appear to favor climate action, which is then spread via diffusion. This would appear to be a clear contrast with welfare states, which evolved within national contexts and are typically seen to be threatened by globalization. However, "Cameron's law" still holds here: more open economies have larger welfare budgets, as in the European Union.
. Interests: the balance of power between class interests -capital and laborhas proved important in explaining differences in welfare systems and outcomes across the OECD world, but this has little purchase on cross-national variations in environmental programs. However, as Robert Falkner has argued, divisions within capitalist groups are important. Countries with substantial fossil fuel reserves generate large economic rents and powerful constituencies wanting to defer climate action as long as possible; the balance between these interests and "green capitalist" interests is important. 18 . Institutions: beyond some agreed-upon institutional factors, such as level of democracy, strength of executive, and partisanship, a wider range needs investigating. These include corporatist patterns of interest representation: earlier studies of broader environmental legislation consistently find that the organization of economic interests and the relationship between these interests and the government is significant. 19 This supports the argument that coordinated market economies with social democratic welfare states tend to see economic and ecological values as mutually reinforcing; they are better placed to integrate environmental concerns alongside economic and social policymaking. [20] [21] [22] . Ideas: ideas can be potent mobilizing or demobilizing forces according to the dominance of special business interests and the structure of the discourse.
In some nations, such as the United States and Australia, climate change has become a crucial "ideological marker" generating strongly polarized positions, whereas in countries like Germany "ecological modernization" provides a crucial bridging discourse. A more pessimistic factor in my view is the continuing ideological domination of neoliberal ideas. There is a strong association between these and climate change denial. 23 This was put most pithily by Martin Wolf: "To admit that a free economy generates a vast global external cost is to admit that the large-scale government regulation so often proposed by hated environmentalists is justified. For many libertarians or classical liberals, the very idea is unsupportable. It is far easier to deny the relevance of the science." 24 This could explain the relative strength of climate change opposition in the Anglosphere. It is a tragedy that climate change agendas have arisen in the era of dominant neoliberal ideas, a denigration of state capacities, and hostility to public initiatives.
This comparative political analysis provides, I think, more understanding of the factors that can facilitate the sort of radical transformations required by green growth.
Reducing Consumption and Working Time
In light of these structural factors -and there are others -the chances of achieving the transition arithmetic outlined above by Nick Stern sound highly improbable. It is not far away from the arithmetic put forward by Tim Jackson in Prosperity Without Growth, which he used to challenge the realism of green growth. 25 Another part of my research is to consider the arguments for restraining consumption in the rich world as a contribution to climate change mitigation. So let me turn finally to this set of issues. I accept the argument that the green growth revolution must take place primarily within the production domain, but that does not mean that consumption is unimportant. It also establishes a strong link with the equity and welfare components of a sustainable society. There are several strands to this research.
First, there is mounting evidence that growth of gross domestic product, above a certain level, does not deliver greater subjective well-being, nor various measures of objective well-being. I will not pursue that here, but the evidence is now overwhelming that gross domestic product is not a good indicator of human well-being, especially in rich economies.
Second, there is a nest of distributive issues. As documented by myself and many others, higher incomes are the main driver of emissions within countries, as well as between countries. But necessities (as defined by income elasticity <1) have a higher greenhouse gas intensity than non-necessities, notably for domestic energy and food. Thus emissions as a share of income rise quite steeply as you descend the income scale. This immediately poses a problem for using carbon pricing as a key strategy for improving the greenness of growth: it is inequitable and can present significant political obstacles. It is also the case that marginal greenhouse gas intensities of expenditure increase with lower incomes; thus income redistribution may increase aggregate emissions. 26 This poses a further dilemma: compensating low-income households could undermine emissions.
Third, as Henry Shue has argued, there is a normative distinction to be made between basic and luxury emissions: "It is not equitable to ask some people to surrender necessities so that other people can retain luxuries. . .The costs ought to be partitioned." 27 This argument was mainly advanced at the global level, but it can also be applied within countries. To have purchase on policymaking, it requires a rigorous normative distinction between necessities and luxuries. In another strand of writing, I have argued that universal basic needs can be rigorously identified in terms of human health and autonomy. 28 On the other hand, the satisfiers to meet those needs will vary enormously with context, wealth, and culture. Nevertheless, one can devise bottom-up methods to estimate these within any given national, social, or cultural group, and these have been used to arrive at agreed-upon measures of poverty and decent living standards. 29 Putting these arguments together makes the case for a strategy for consumption. This should prioritize need-satisfiers over other preferences, nonmaterial satisfiers over material satisfiers, and low-carbon satisfiers over carbon-intensive satisfiers. (Satisfiers include both goods and services, but also activities and relationships.) There are various ways of doing this, which I have discussed elsewhere. 30 It calls for a more thought-through agenda around consumption. I am arguing here for a curb on consumption in rich countries, such as the United Kingdom, as a contribution toward rapid decarbonization -in other words, away from green growth and toward planned degrowth. But is not any step along this road politically nonsensical? When did electorates ever support deliberately engineered declines in consumption and income? ("Over the last five years" might be one answer.) So I will end with a call for a transitional strategy from green growth to partial degrowth that I believe can work: reduced working time.
One is taught, in introductory economics courses, that the productivity dividend can be taken in the form of increased income or increased "leisure"; yet, as Robert Skidelsky points out, this critical option rarely figures in economic analysis at more advanced levels. 31 Reducing hours of work can reduce emissions in 2 ways: via the scale effect -reducing incomes, expenditures, consumption, and emissions -and via the compositional effect, by altering time and expenditure budgets toward lower carbon intensity. Again, there are marked variations between capitalist economies; for example, since 1975, when they had similar hours of work, the United States has reduced average hours by 4% and Germany by 22%. All other things being equal, Germany has deployed its productivity dividend in a less environmentally harmful way than the United States. A cross-national analysis of 29 OECD countries finds that "annual working hours are a large and significant predictor of ecological outcomes." 32, 33 Such policies could in principle redistribute employment opportunities, enhance individual choice and well-being, and save carbon. However, care would be needed to ensure that this policy shift would not raise other distributional dilemmas, including the risk of increasing poverty among the low-paid, and growing "time inequality" between the higher and lower paid. 34 This is a call for new "eco-social policies" that exploit synergies between decarbonization and redistribution, some of which I have discussed elsewhere. These include the "reverse pricing" of domestic energy, properly subsidized retrofitting programs, and community ownership of renewable energy schemes.
Conclusion
I conclude briefly by reiterating that preventing dangerous climate change is an epochal challenge, ill-served by some comments of economists such as Paul Krugman. From social scientists it will require the robust interdisciplinary approach advocated by Craig Calhoun, not one prioritizing market mechanisms. It will need to be integrated closely with social policies pursuing equity goals. And it should begin to develop a strategy for consumption alongside production.
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